| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28539 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28539 |
| The Value of Privacy in Cartels: An Analysis of the Inner Workings of a Bidding Ring | |
| Kei Kawai; Jun Nakabayashi; Juan M. Ortner | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-03-08 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the inner workings of a bidding cartel focusing on the way in which bidders communicate with one another regarding how each bidder should bid. We show that the designated winner of the cartel can attain higher payoffs by randomizing its bid and keeping it secret from other bidders when defection is a concern. Intuitively, randomization makes defection less attractive as potential defectors face the risk of not winning the auction even if they deviate. We illustrate how our theoretical predictions are borne out in practice by studying a bidding cartel that operated in the town of Kumatori, Japan. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Antitrust |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28539 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586212 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kei Kawai,Jun Nakabayashi,Juan M. Ortner. The Value of Privacy in Cartels: An Analysis of the Inner Workings of a Bidding Ring. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28539.pdf（399KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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