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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w28553 |
来源ID | Working Paper 28553 |
Government Policies in a Granular Global Economy | |
Cecile Gaubert; Oleg Itskhoki; Maximilian Vogler | |
发表日期 | 2021-03-15 |
出版年 | 2021 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We use the granular model of international trade developed in Gaubert and Itskhoki (2020) to study the rationale and implications of three types of government interventions typically targeted at large individual firms -- antitrust, trade and industrial policies. We find that in antitrust regulation, governments face an incentive to be overly lenient in accepting mergers of large domestic firms, which acts akin to beggar-thy-neighbor trade policy in sectors with strong comparative advantage. In trade policy, targeting large individual foreign exporters rather than entire sectors is desirable from the point of view of a national government. Doing so minimizes the pass-through of import tariffs into domestic consumer prices, placing a greater portion of the burden on foreign producers. Finally, we show that subsidizing `national champions' is generally suboptimal in closed economies as it leads to an excessive build-up of market power, but it may become unilaterally welfare improving in open economies. We contrast unilaterally optimal policies with the coordinated global optimal policy and emphasize the need for international policy cooperation in these domains. |
主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; International Economics ; Trade ; Industrial Organization ; Antitrust ; Regulatory Economics |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28553 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586225 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Cecile Gaubert,Oleg Itskhoki,Maximilian Vogler. Government Policies in a Granular Global Economy. 2021. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w28553.pdf(947KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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