| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28589 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28589 |
| Dynamic Oligopoly Pricing with Asymmetric Information: Implications for Horizontal Mergers | |
| Andrew Sweeting; Xuezhen Tao; Xinlu Yao | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-03-22 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We model differentiated product pricing by firms that possess private information about serially-correlated state variables, such as their marginal costs, and can use prices to signal information to rivals. In a dynamic game, we show that signaling can raise prices significantly above static complete information Nash levels, even when the privately observed state variables are restricted to lie in narrow ranges. We calibrate our model using data from the beer industry, and show that our model can explain changes in price levels, price dynamics and cost pass-through after the 2008 MillerCoors joint venture. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Economics of Information ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Antitrust ; Industry Studies |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28589 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586263 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrew Sweeting,Xuezhen Tao,Xinlu Yao. Dynamic Oligopoly Pricing with Asymmetric Information: Implications for Horizontal Mergers. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28589.pdf（1174KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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