| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28599 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28599 |
| Sovereign Debt Ratchets and Welfare Destruction | |
| Peter M. DeMarzo; Zhiguo He; Fabrice Tourre | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-03-22 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | An impatient and risk-neutral government can sell bonds at any time to a more patient group of competitive lenders. The key problem: the government cannot commit to either a particular financing strategy, or a default strategy. Despite risk-neutrality, in equilibrium debt adjusts slowly towards a target debt-to-income level, exacerbating booms and busts. Most strikingly, for any debt maturity structure, the gains from trade are entirely dissipated when trading opportunities are continuous, as lenders compete with each other and the government competes with itself. Moreover, citizens who are more patient than their government are strictly harmed by the unrestricted borrowing. We fully characterize debt dynamics, ergodics, and comparative statics when income follows a geometric Brownian motion, and analyze several commitment devices that allow the sovereign to recapture some gains from trade: self-imposed restrictions on debt issuances and levels, as well as “market-imposed” discipline. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; International Economics ; International Finance ; International Macroeconomics ; Globalization and International Relations ; Financial Economics ; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28599 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586272 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Peter M. DeMarzo,Zhiguo He,Fabrice Tourre. Sovereign Debt Ratchets and Welfare Destruction. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28599.pdf（1078KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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