| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28602 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28602 |
| Patent Auctions and Bidding Coalitions: Structuring the Sale of Club Goods | |
| John Asker; Mariagiovanna Baccara; SangMok Lee | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-03-29 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Auctioneers of patents are observed to allow joint bidding by coalitions of buyers. These auctions are distinguished by the good for sale being non-rivalrous, but still excludable, in consumption{that is, they auctions of club goods. This affects how coalitional bidding impacts auction performance. We study the implications of coalitions of bidders on second-price (or equivalently, ascending-price) auctions. Although the formation of coalitions can benefit the seller, we show that stable coalition profiles tend to consist of excessively large coalitions, to the detriment of both auction revenue and social welfare. Limiting the permitted coalition size increases efficiency and confers benefits on the seller. Lastly, we compare the revenues generated by patent auctions and multi-license auctions, and we find that the latter are superior in a large class of environments. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Firm Behavior ; Antitrust ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28602 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586275 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | John Asker,Mariagiovanna Baccara,SangMok Lee. Patent Auctions and Bidding Coalitions: Structuring the Sale of Club Goods. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28602.pdf（546KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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