| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28609 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28609 |
| The Rise of Dual-Class Stock IPOs | |
| Dhruv Aggarwal; Ofer Eldar; Yael Hochberg; Lubomir P. Litov | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-03-29 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We create a novel dataset to examine the nature and determinants of dual-class IPOs. We document that dual-class firms have different types of controlling shareholders and wedges between voting and economic rights. We find that the founders' wedge is largest when founders have stronger bargaining power. The increase in founder wedge over time is due to increased willingness by venture capitalists to accommodate founder control and technological shocks that reduced firms' needs for external financing. Greater founder bargaining power is also associated with a lower likelihood of sunset provisions that eliminate dual-class structures within specified periods. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28609 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586282 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dhruv Aggarwal,Ofer Eldar,Yael Hochberg,et al. The Rise of Dual-Class Stock IPOs. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28609.pdf（1045KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
