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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w28630
来源IDWorking Paper 28630
Can Automatic Retention Improve Health Insurance Market Outcomes?
Adrianna L. McIntyre; Mark Shepard; Myles Wagner
发表日期2021-04-05
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要There is growing interest in market design using default rules and other choice architecture principles to steer consumers toward desirable outcomes. Using data from Massachusetts’ health insurance exchange, we study an "automatic retention" policy intended to prevent coverage interruptions among low-income enrollees. Rather than disenroll people who lapse in paying premiums, the policy automatically switches them to an available free plan until they actively cancel or lose eligibility. We find that automatic retention has a sizable impact, switching 14% of consumers annually and differentially retaining healthy, low-cost individuals. The results illustrate the power of defaults to shape insurance coverage outcomes.
主题Microeconomics ; Behavioral Economics ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w28630
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586303
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Adrianna L. McIntyre,Mark Shepard,Myles Wagner. Can Automatic Retention Improve Health Insurance Market Outcomes?. 2021.
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