| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28630 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28630 |
| Can Automatic Retention Improve Health Insurance Market Outcomes? | |
| Adrianna L. McIntyre; Mark Shepard; Myles Wagner | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-04-05 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | There is growing interest in market design using default rules and other choice architecture principles to steer consumers toward desirable outcomes. Using data from Massachusetts’ health insurance exchange, we study an "automatic retention" policy intended to prevent coverage interruptions among low-income enrollees. Rather than disenroll people who lapse in paying premiums, the policy automatically switches them to an available free plan until they actively cancel or lose eligibility. We find that automatic retention has a sizable impact, switching 14% of consumers annually and differentially retaining healthy, low-cost individuals. The results illustrate the power of defaults to shape insurance coverage outcomes. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Behavioral Economics ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28630 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586303 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Adrianna L. McIntyre,Mark Shepard,Myles Wagner. Can Automatic Retention Improve Health Insurance Market Outcomes?. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28630.pdf（193KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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