全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Civil Service Exams and Organizational Performance: Evidence from the Pendleton Act

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w28665
来源ID	Working Paper 28665
	Civil Service Exams and Organizational Performance: Evidence from the Pendleton Act
	Diana Moreira; Santiago Pérez
发表日期	2021-04-12
出版年	2021
语种	英语
摘要	Competitive exams are a standard method for selecting civil servants. Yet, there is limited evidence on their effectiveness. We digitize personnel and financial data to study the impacts of the 1883 Pendleton Act, which mandated exams for some employees in the largest US customs-collection districts. Although the act improved targeted employees’ professional background and reduced turnover, it did not increase cost-effectiveness in customs revenue collection. Moreover, it incentivized hiring in exam-exempted positions, distorting districts’ hierarchical structures. These results illustrate how, by triggering countervailing organizational responses, policies that succeed at improving specific organizational aspects might nevertheless fail to improve overall performance.
主题	Public Economics ; History ; Other History
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w28665
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586339
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Diana Moreira,Santiago Pérez. Civil Service Exams and Organizational Performance: Evidence from the Pendleton Act. 2021.