| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28674 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28674 |
| Minority Turnout and Representation under Cumulative Voting. An Experiment. | |
| Alessandra Casella; Jeffrey Guo; Michelle Jiang | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-04-12 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Under majoritarian election systems, securing participation and representation of minorities remains an open problem, made salient in the US by its history of voter suppression. One remedy recommended by the courts is Cumulative Voting (CV): each voter has as many votes as open positions and can cumulate votes on as few candidates as desired. Theory predicts that CV encourages the minority to overcome obstacles to voting: although each voter is treated equally, CV increases minority's turnout relative to the majority, and the minority's share of seats won. A lab experiment based on a costly voting design strongly supports both predictions. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28674 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586347 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alessandra Casella,Jeffrey Guo,Michelle Jiang. Minority Turnout and Representation under Cumulative Voting. An Experiment.. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28674.pdf（1343KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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