| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28683 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28683 |
| Combating Political Corruption with Policy Bundles | |
| Frederico Finan; Maurizio Mazzocco | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-04-26 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper, we develop a dynamic model of politicians who can engage in corruption. The model offers important insights into what determines corruption and how to design policy to combat it. We estimate the model using data from Brazil to measure voters' willingness to pay for various commonly-proposed anti-corruption policies, such as increasing audit probabilities, increasing politicians' wages, and extending term limits. We document that while voters have a high willingness to pay for audit policies, due to their effectiveness in reducing corruption, a multi-pronged approach that bundles certain policies can achieve similar welfare gains at a fraction of the cost. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28683 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586371 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Frederico Finan,Maurizio Mazzocco. Combating Political Corruption with Policy Bundles. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28683.pdf（553KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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