| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28728 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28728 |
| On the Welfare Gains from Tradeable Benefits-in-Kind | |
| Martin Ravallion | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-05-03 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Governments often prohibit resale of the benefits-in-kind provided by antipoverty programs. Yet the personal gains from those benefits are likely to vary and to be known privately, so there can be gains to poor people from trading their assignments. We know very little about those gains. To help address this knowledge gap, the paper models a competitive market for assignments, and simulates the market using an unusual survey of workers on a rural public-works scheme in a poor state of India. The results indicate large gains from tradeable assignments after first randomizing. The gains exceed those from poverty targeting without trade and are not lower for poorer households or female workers. Fully realizing the gains from trade in practice may require complementary policies to help people access the market and to support its administration and regulation. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Taxation ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Poverty and Wellbeing ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28728 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586402 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Martin Ravallion. On the Welfare Gains from Tradeable Benefits-in-Kind. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28728.pdf（1324KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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