| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28735 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28735 |
| What\u2019s Missing in Environmental (Self-)Monitoring: Evidence from Strategic Shutdowns of Pollution Monitors | |
| Yingfei Mu; Edward A. Rubin; Eric Zou | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-05-03 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Regulators often rely on regulated entities to self-monitor compliance, potentially creating strategic incentives for endogenous monitoring. This paper builds a framework to detect whether local governments skip air pollution monitoring when they expect air quality to deteriorate. The core of our method tests whether the timing of monitor shutdowns coincides with the counties’ air quality alerts – public advisories based on local governments’ own pollution forecasts. Applying the method to a monitor in Jersey City, NJ, suspected of a deliberate shutdown during the 2013 “Bridgegate” traffic jam, we find a 33% reduction of this monitor’s sampling rate on pollution-alert days. Building on large-scale inference tools, we then apply the method to test more than 1,300 monitors across the U.S., finding 14 metro areas with clusters of monitors showing similar strategic behavior. We assess geometric imputation and remote-sensing technologies as potential solutions to deter future strategic monitoring. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Estimation Methods ; Subnational Fiscal Issues ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Environment |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28735 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586409 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Yingfei Mu,Edward A. Rubin,Eric Zou. What\u2019s Missing in Environmental (Self-)Monitoring: Evidence from Strategic Shutdowns of Pollution Monitors. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28735.pdf（1867KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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