| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28778 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28778 |
| Do Firms with Specialized M&A Staff Make Better Acquisitions? | |
| Sinan Gokkaya; Xi Liu; René M. Stulz | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-05-10 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We open the black box of the M&A decision process by constructing a comprehensive sample of US firms with specialized M&A staff. We investigate whether specialized M&A staff improves acquisition performance or facilitates managerial empire building instead. We find that firms with specialized M&A staff make better acquisitions when acquisition performance is measured by stock price reactions to announcements, long-run stock returns, operating performance, divestitures, and analyst earnings forecasts. This effect does not hold when the CEO is powerful, overconfident, or entrenched. Acquisitions by firms without specialized staff do not create value, on average. We provide evidence on mechanisms through which specialized M&A staff improves acquisition performance. For identification, we use the staggered recognition of inevitable disclosure doctrine as a source of exogenous variation in the employment of specialized M&A staff. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28778 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586452 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sinan Gokkaya,Xi Liu,René M. Stulz. Do Firms with Specialized M&A Staff Make Better Acquisitions?. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28778.pdf（670KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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