| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28779 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28779 |
| Should There Be Vertical Choice in Health Insurance Markets? | |
| Victoria R. Marone; Adrienne Sabety | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-05-10 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the welfare effects of offering choice over coverage levels—“vertical choice”—in regulated health insurance markets. We emphasize that heterogeneity in the efficient level of coverage is not sufficient to motivate choice. When premiums do not reflect individuals' costs, it may not be in consumers' best interest to select their efficient coverage level. We show that vertical choice is efficient only if consumers with higher willingness to pay for insurance have a higher efficient level of coverage. We investigate this condition empirically and find that as long as a minimum coverage level can be enforced, the welfare gains from vertical choice are either zero or economically small. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28779 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586453 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Victoria R. Marone,Adrienne Sabety. Should There Be Vertical Choice in Health Insurance Markets?. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28779.pdf（1145KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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