| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28826 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28826 |
| Tax Evasion, Efficiency, and Bunching in the Presence of Enforcement Notches | |
| Daniel M. Hungerman | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-05-24 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A recent literature has studied bunching at notches in tax systems; but work on the implications of bunching for welfare has been limited. We consider a setting where there are discrete changes in the enforcement of tax compliance at certain levels of reported income, creating notches that can lead to bunching. We find that greater levels of bunching can be associated with greater tax efficiency. A simulation exercise demonstrates that notches with greater bunching can be associated with higher welfare than notches with less bunching, and that a tax system with bunching at a notch can generate higher overall social welfare than a revenue-equivalent no-evasion linear tax. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Taxation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28826 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586500 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daniel M. Hungerman. Tax Evasion, Efficiency, and Bunching in the Presence of Enforcement Notches. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28826.pdf（465KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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