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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w28857
来源IDWorking Paper 28857
When Do Environmental Externalities Have Electoral Consequences? Evidence from Fracking
Judson Boomhower
发表日期2021-05-31
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要The electoral salience of some issues may diminish when one politician has authority over many policy areas. This study measures the role of environmental regulation in concurrent elections for governors and specialized energy regulators in two U.S. states. I first show that while both offices can influence environmental and energy policies, quantitative analysis of campaign news coverage reveals clear differences in the importance of these issues in the two races. Next, I use geologic variation in earthquakes caused by oil and gas production to measure the electoral consequences of a costly environmental externality. There are measurable effects only in the energy regulator race. These results are consistent with theories of issue bundling. Finally, the unbundling effects that I measure appear to be themselves limited by voter attentiveness and partisanship.
主题Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Environment
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w28857
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586531
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Judson Boomhower. When Do Environmental Externalities Have Electoral Consequences? Evidence from Fracking. 2021.
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