| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28884 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28884 |
| A Model of Online Misinformation | |
| Daron Acemoglu; Asuman Ozdaglar; James Siderius | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-06-07 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We present a model of online content sharing where agents sequentially observe an article and must decide whether to share it with others. This content may or may not contain misinformation. Agents gain utility from positive social media interactions but do not want to be called out for propagating misinformation. We characterize the (Bayesian-Nash) equilibria of this social media game and show sharing exhibits strategic complementarity. Our first main result establishes that the impact of homophily on content virality is non-monotone: homophily reduces the broader circulation of an article, but it creates echo chambers that impose less discipline on the sharing of low-reliability content. This insight underpins our second main result, which demonstrates that social media platforms interested in maximizing engagement tend to design their algorithms to create more homophilic communication patterns (“filter bubbles”). We show that platform incentives to amplify misinformation are particularly pronounced for low-reliability content likely to contain misinformation and when there is greater polarization and more divisive content. Finally, we discuss various regulatory solutions to such platform-manufactured misinformation. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Other ; Economic Systems |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28884 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586558 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daron Acemoglu,Asuman Ozdaglar,James Siderius. A Model of Online Misinformation. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28884.pdf（629KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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