| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28903 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28903 |
| Equilibrium Effects of Pay Transparency | |
| Zoe B. Cullen; Bobak Pakzad-Hurson | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-06-14 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The public discourse around pay transparency has focused on the direct effect: how workers seek to rectify pay inequities through renegotiation. The question of how wage-setting and employment practices of the firm respond has received less attention. To study these equilibrium outcomes, we test our model of bargaining under incomplete information with an analysis of pay transparency mandates in the context of the U.S. private sector. Our model predicts that transparency reduces the individual bargaining power of workers, leading to lower average wages. A key insight is that employers credibly refuse to pay high wages to any one worker to avoid costly renegotiations with others under transparency. In situations where workers do not have individual bargaining power, such as under a collective bargaining agreement or in markets with posted wages, greater transparency has a muted impact on average wages. We test these predictions by evaluating the adoption of U.S. state legislation protecting the right of workers to inquire about the salaries of their coworkers. Consistent with our prediction, the laws lead wages to decline by approximately 2% overall, but effects are muted when workers have low individual bargaining power. Our model provides a unified framework to analyze a wide range of transparency policies, and reconciles effects of transparency mandates documented in a variety of countries and contexts. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Economics of Information ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28903 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586577 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Zoe B. Cullen,Bobak Pakzad-Hurson. Equilibrium Effects of Pay Transparency. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28903.pdf（961KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
