| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28908 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28908 |
| Competition Laws, Governance, and Firm Value | |
| Ross Levine; Chen Lin; Wensi Xie | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-06-14 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Do antitrust laws influence corporate valuations? We evaluate the relationship between firm value and laws limiting firms from engaging in anticompetitive agreements, abusing dominant positions, and conducting M&As that restrict competition. Using firm-level data from 99 countries over the 1990-2010 period, we discover that valuations rise after countries strengthen competition laws. The effects are larger among firms with more severe pre-existing agency problems: firms in countries with weaker investor protection laws, with weaker firm-specific governance provisions, and with greater opacity. The results suggest that antitrust laws that intensify competition exert a positive influence on valuations by reducing agency problems. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Antitrust |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28908 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586582 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ross Levine,Chen Lin,Wensi Xie. Competition Laws, Governance, and Firm Value. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28908.pdf（773KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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