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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w28939 |
来源ID | Working Paper 28939 |
Signaling and Discrimination in Collaborative Projects | |
Paula Onuchic; ⓡ; Debraj Ray | |
发表日期 | 2021-06-21 |
出版年 | 2021 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We propose a model of collaborative work in pairs. Each potential partner draws an idea from a distribution that depends on their unobserved ability. The partners then choose to combine their ideas, or work separately. These decisions are based on the intrinsic value of their projects, but also on signaling payoffs, which depend on the public’s assessment of individual contributions to joint work. In equilibrium, collaboration strategies both justify and are justified by public assessments. When partners are symmetric, equilibria with symmetric collaborative strategies are often fragile, in a sense made precise in the paper. In such cases, asymmetric equilibria exist: upon observing a collaborative outcome, the public ascribes higher credit to one of the partners based on payoff-irrelevant “identities.” Such favored identities do receive a higher payoff relative to their disfavored counterparts conditional on collaborating, but may receive lower overall expected payoff. Finally, we study a policy that sometimes (but not always) clarifies the ordinal ranking of partners’ contributions, and find that such disclosures can be Pareto-improving and reduce the scope for discrimination across payoff-irrelevant identities. |
主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Economics of Information ; Labor Economics ; Labor Discrimination |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28939 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586613 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Paula Onuchic,ⓡ,Debraj Ray. Signaling and Discrimination in Collaborative Projects. 2021. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w28939.pdf(677KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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