| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28974 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28974 |
| Risk Perceptions, Board Networks, and Directors\u2019 Monitoring | |
| Wenzhi Ding; Chen Lin; Thomas Schmid; Michael S. Weisbach | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-06-28 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | What makes independent directors perform their monitoring duty? One possible reason is that they are worried about being sanctioned by regulators if they do not monitor sufficiently well. Using unique features of the Chinese financial market, we estimate the extent to which independent directors’ perceptions of the likelihood of receiving a regulatory penalty affect their monitoring. Our results suggest that they are more likely to vote against management after observing how another director in their board network received a regulatory penalty related to negligence. This effect is long-lasting and stronger if the observing and penalized directors share the same professional background or gender and if the observing director is at a firm that is more likely to be penalized. These results provide direct evidence suggesting that the possibility of receiving penalties is an important factor motivating directors. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28974 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586648 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Wenzhi Ding,Chen Lin,Thomas Schmid,et al. Risk Perceptions, Board Networks, and Directors\u2019 Monitoring. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28974.pdf（2102KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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