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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w28974
来源IDWorking Paper 28974
Risk Perceptions, Board Networks, and Directors\u2019 Monitoring
Wenzhi Ding; Chen Lin; Thomas Schmid; Michael S. Weisbach
发表日期2021-06-28
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要What makes independent directors perform their monitoring duty? One possible reason is that they are worried about being sanctioned by regulators if they do not monitor sufficiently well. Using unique features of the Chinese financial market, we estimate the extent to which independent directors’ perceptions of the likelihood of receiving a regulatory penalty affect their monitoring. Our results suggest that they are more likely to vote against management after observing how another director in their board network received a regulatory penalty related to negligence. This effect is long-lasting and stronger if the observing and penalized directors share the same professional background or gender and if the observing director is at a firm that is more likely to be penalized. These results provide direct evidence suggesting that the possibility of receiving penalties is an important factor motivating directors.
主题Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w28974
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586648
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GB/T 7714
Wenzhi Ding,Chen Lin,Thomas Schmid,et al. Risk Perceptions, Board Networks, and Directors\u2019 Monitoring. 2021.
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