| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28997 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28997 |
| Reputation and Partial Default | |
| Manuel Amador; Christopher Phelan | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-07-05 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper presents a continuous-time reputation model of sovereign debt allowing for both varying levels of partial default and full default. In it, a government can be a non-strategic commitment type, or a strategic opportunistic type, and a government's reputation is its equilibrium Bayesian posterior of being the commitment type. Our equilibrium has that for bond levels reachable by both types without defaulting, bigger partial defaults (or bigger haircuts for bond holders) imply higher interest rates for subsequent bond issuances, as in the data. |
| 主题 | International Economics ; International Finance ; International Macroeconomics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28997 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586671 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Manuel Amador,Christopher Phelan. Reputation and Partial Default. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28997.pdf（622KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
