| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29005 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29005 |
| Voting in Shareholders Meetings | |
| Laurent Bouton; Aniol Llorente-Saguer; Antonin Macé; Dimitrios Xefteris | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-07-12 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies voting in shareholders meetings. We focus on the informational efficiency of different voting mechanisms, taking into account that they affect both management’s incentives before the meeting and shareholders’ decisions at the meeting. We first deal with the case in which the management does not affect the proposal being voted on. We show that, for any distribution of shareholdings and any informational asymmetry among shareholders, a voting mechanism with a richer ballot space dominates a voting mechanism with a poorer one. We then show that efficiency requires full divisibility of the votes. Second, we consider the case in which the management decides whether to put the proposal to a vote. The properties of a voting mechanism then depend both on its voting efficiency and on how it affects managers’ incentives to select good proposals. We uncover a trade-o¤ between selection and voting efficiency underlying the comparison of voting mechanisms: the higher voting efficiency of mechanisms with richer ballot space implies worse selection incentives. In some cases, the negative effect of worse selection incentives on shareholders’ welfare can be large enough to wash out the higher voting efficiency of even the most efficient mechanism. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29005 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586679 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Laurent Bouton,Aniol Llorente-Saguer,Antonin Macé,et al. Voting in Shareholders Meetings. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29005.pdf（874KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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