| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29026 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29026 |
| Geopolitics and International Trade Infrastructure | |
| Sebastian Galiani; José Manuel Paz y Miño; Gustavo Torrens | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-07-19 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a simple (incumbent versus entrant) strategic deterrence model to study the economic and geopolitical interactions underlying international trade-related infrastructure projects such as the Panama Canal. We study the incentives for global geopolitical players to support allied satellite countries where these projects are or could potentially be built. We show that even if no effective competitor emerges, the appearance of a geopolitical challenger capable of credibly supporting the entrant has a pro-competition economic effect which benefits consumers all over the world. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29026 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586700 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sebastian Galiani,José Manuel Paz y Miño,Gustavo Torrens. Geopolitics and International Trade Infrastructure. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29026.pdf（622KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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