| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29028 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29028 |
| When Is Tinkering with Safety Net Programs Harmful to Beneficiaries? | |
| Jeffrey Clemens; Michael J. Wither | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-07-19 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Interactions between redistributive policies can confront low-income households with complicated choices. We study one such interaction, namely the relationship between Medicaid eligibility thresholds and the minimum wage. A minimum wage increase reduces the number of hours a low-skilled individual can work while retaining Medicaid eligibility. We show that the empirical and welfare implications of this interaction can depend crucially on the relevance of labor market frictions. Absent frictions, affected workers may maintain Medicaid eligibility through small reductions in hours of work. With frictions, affected workers may lose Medicaid eligibility unless they leave their initial job. Empirically, we find that workers facing this scenario became less likely to participate in Medicaid, less likely to work, and more likely to spend time looking for new jobs, including search while employed. The observed outcomes suggest that low-skilled workers face substantial labor market frictions. Because adjustment is costly, tinkering with safety net program parameters that determine the location of program eligibility notches can be harmful to beneficiaries. |
| 主题 | Subnational Fiscal Issues ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Poverty and Wellbeing |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29028 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586702 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jeffrey Clemens,Michael J. Wither. When Is Tinkering with Safety Net Programs Harmful to Beneficiaries?. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29028.pdf（715KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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