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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w29029 |
来源ID | Working Paper 29029 |
Do Collateral Sanctions Work? Evidence from the IRS\u2019 Passport Certification and Revocation Process | |
Paul R. Organ; Alex Ruda; Joel Slemrod; Alex Turk | |
发表日期 | 2021-07-19 |
出版年 | 2021 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Penalties for tax evasion are typically financial, but many jurisdictions also utilize collateral sanctions that deny access to some government-provided service. To learn about the effectiveness of such penalties, we examine a U.S. policy restricting passport access for taxpayers with substantial tax debt, known as “certification.” We find an immediate and strong positive effect on compliance actions when a passport request is denied. We then take advantage of randomization during the policy rollout to identify the direct compliance effect of certification, and find smaller but non-trivial effects whose heterogeneity is consistent with measures of taxpayers’ value of having a passport. |
主题 | Public Economics ; Taxation |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29029 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586703 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Paul R. Organ,Alex Ruda,Joel Slemrod,et al. Do Collateral Sanctions Work? Evidence from the IRS\u2019 Passport Certification and Revocation Process. 2021. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w29029.pdf(2746KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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