全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Do Collateral Sanctions Work? Evidence from the IRS\u2019 Passport Certification and Revocation Process

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w29029
来源ID	Working Paper 29029
	Do Collateral Sanctions Work? Evidence from the IRS\u2019 Passport Certification and Revocation Process
	Paul R. Organ; Alex Ruda; Joel Slemrod; Alex Turk
发表日期	2021-07-19
出版年	2021
语种	英语
摘要	Penalties for tax evasion are typically financial, but many jurisdictions also utilize collateral sanctions that deny access to some government-provided service. To learn about the effectiveness of such penalties, we examine a U.S. policy restricting passport access for taxpayers with substantial tax debt, known as “certification.” We find an immediate and strong positive effect on compliance actions when a passport request is denied. We then take advantage of randomization during the policy rollout to identify the direct compliance effect of certification, and find smaller but non-trivial effects whose heterogeneity is consistent with measures of taxpayers’ value of having a passport.
主题	Public Economics ; Taxation
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w29029
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586703
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Paul R. Organ,Alex Ruda,Joel Slemrod,et al. Do Collateral Sanctions Work? Evidence from the IRS\u2019 Passport Certification and Revocation Process. 2021.