| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29036 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29036 |
| Creating Controversy in Proxy Voting Advice | |
| Andrey Malenko; Nadya Malenko; Chester S. Spatt | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-07-19 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze the design of recommendations (available to all shareholders) and research reports (available only to subscribers) by a proxy advisor, who maximizes profits from selling information to shareholders. We show that the advisor benefits from biasing its recommendations against the a priori more likely alternative, thereby “creating controversy” for the vote. In contrast, it serves the advisor’s interest to produce precise and unbiased research reports. Our results help reinterpret empirical patterns of shareholders’ voting behavior, suggesting that proxy advisors’ recommendations may not be a suitable benchmark for evaluating shareholders’ votes. Our model also rationalizes the one-size-fits-all approach in recommendations. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Economics of Information ; Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29036 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586710 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrey Malenko,Nadya Malenko,Chester S. Spatt. Creating Controversy in Proxy Voting Advice. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29036.pdf（591KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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