| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29043 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29043 |
| Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information | |
| Marcelo A. Fernandez; Kirill Rudov; Leeat Yariv | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-07-19 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the impacts of incomplete information on centralized one-to-one matching markets. We focus on the commonly used Deferred Acceptance mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962). We show that many complete-information results are fragile to a small infusion of uncertainty about others' preferences. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Economics of Information |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29043 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586717 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marcelo A. Fernandez,Kirill Rudov,Leeat Yariv. Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29043.pdf（337KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
