| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29052 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29052 |
| A Signal to End Child Marriage: Theory and Experimental Evidence from Bangladesh | |
| Nina Buchmann; Erica M. Field; Rachel Glennerster; Shahana Nazneen; Xiao Yu Wang | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-07-19 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Child marriage remains common even where female schooling and employment opportunities have grown. We introduce a signaling model in which bride type is imperfectly observed but preferred types have lower returns to delaying marriage. We show that in this environment the market might pool on early marriage even when everyone would benefit from delay. In this setting, offering a small incentive can delay marriage of all treated types and untreated non-preferred types, while programs that act directly on norms can unintentionally encourage early marriage. We test these theoretical predictions by experimentally evaluating a financial incentive to delay marriage alongside a girls’ empowerment program designed to shift norms. As predicted, girls eligible for the incentive are 19% less likely to marry underage, as are nonpreferred type women ineligible for the incentive. Meanwhile, the empowerment program was successful in promoting more progressive gender norms but failed to decrease adolescent marriage and increased dowry payments. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Behavioral Economics ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29052 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586726 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nina Buchmann,Erica M. Field,Rachel Glennerster,et al. A Signal to End Child Marriage: Theory and Experimental Evidence from Bangladesh. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29052.pdf（657KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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