| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w29096
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 29096
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| Buying Data from Consumers: The Impact of Monitoring Programs in U.S. Auto Insurance |
| Yizhou Jin; Shoshana Vasserman
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| 发表日期 | 2021-08-02
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| 出版年 | 2021
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | New technologies have enabled firms to elicit granular behavioral data from consumers in exchange for lower prices and better experiences. This data can mitigate asymmetric information and moral hazard, but it may also increase firms’ market power if kept proprietary. We study a voluntary monitoring program by a major U.S. auto insurer, in which drivers accept short-term tracking in exchange for potential discounts on future premiums. Using a proprietary dataset matched with competitor price menus, we document that safer drivers self-select into monitoring, and those who opt in become yet 30% safer while monitored. Using an equilibrium model of consumer choice and firm pricing for insurance and monitoring, we find that the monitoring program generates large profit and welfare gains. However, large demand frictions hurt monitoring adoption, forcing the firm to offer large discounts to induce opt-in while preventing the unmonitored pool from unraveling given the competitive environment. A counterfactual policy requiring the firm to make monitoring data public would thus further reduce the firm’s incentive to elicit monitoring data, leading to less monitoring and lower consumer welfare in equilibrium. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29096
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586770
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Yizhou Jin,Shoshana Vasserman. Buying Data from Consumers: The Impact of Monitoring Programs in U.S. Auto Insurance. 2021.
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文件名：
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w29096.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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