| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29106 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29106 |
| Why do Bank Boards have Risk Committees? | |
| René M. Stulz; James G. Tompkins; Rohan Williamson; Zhongxia (Shelly) Ye | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-08-02 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a theory of bank board risk committees. With this theory, such committees are valuable even though there is no expectation that bank risk is lower if the bank has a well-functioning risk committee. As predicted by our theory (1) many large and complex banks voluntarily chose to have a risk committee before the Dodd-Frank Act forced bank holding companies with assets in excess of $10 billion to have a board risk committee, and (2) establishing a board risk committee does not reduce a bank’s risk on average. Using unique interview data, we show that the work of risk committees is consistent with our theory in part. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29106 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586780 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | René M. Stulz,James G. Tompkins,Rohan Williamson,et al. Why do Bank Boards have Risk Committees?. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29106.pdf（376KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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