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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w29115 |
来源ID | Working Paper 29115 |
Optimal Tariffs and Trade Policy Formation: U.S. Evidence from the Smoot-Hawley Era | |
Douglas A. Irwin; Anson Soderbery | |
发表日期 | 2021-08-02 |
出版年 | 2021 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper examines the political economy of U.S. trade policy around the time of the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930, a period when policy was unconstrained by trade agreements. We consider a model of politically-optimal trade policy for a large country that can influence its terms of trade and where workers and firms lobby for protection. The predictions of the model hinge on import demand and export supply elasticities, which we estimate using detailed U.S. import data from 1927-35, as well as industry lobbying data. We find that tariff levels are largely determined by firm lobbies, but about about 5 percentage points of the tariffs are explained by terms of trade considerations. Decomposing the politically-optimal tariff in 1931 reveals an intensification of demand for protection by workers in the Smoot-Hawley tariff. |
主题 | International Economics ; Trade |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29115 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586789 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Douglas A. Irwin,Anson Soderbery. Optimal Tariffs and Trade Policy Formation: U.S. Evidence from the Smoot-Hawley Era. 2021. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w29115.pdf(490KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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