| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29143 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29143 |
| Regulatory Costs of Being Public: Evidence from Bunching Estimation | |
| Michael Ewens; Kairong Xiao; Ting Xu | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-08-16 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The increased burden of disclosure and governance regulations is often cited as a key reason for the significant decline in the number of publicly-listed companies in the U.S. We explore the connection between regulatory costs and the number of listed firms by exploiting a regulatory quirk: many rules trigger when a firm’s public float exceeds a threshold. Consistent with firms seeking to avoid costly regulation, we document significant bunching around multiple regulatory thresholds introduced from 1992 to 2012. We present a revealed preference estimation strategy that uses this behavior to quantify regulatory costs. Our estimates show that various disclosure and internal governance rules lead to a total compliance cost of 4.1% of the market capitalization for a median U.S. public firm. Regulatory costs have a greater impact on private firms’ IPO decisions than on public firms’ going private decisions. However, heightened regulatory costs only explain a small fraction of the decline in the number of public firms. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29143 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586817 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Ewens,Kairong Xiao,Ting Xu. Regulatory Costs of Being Public: Evidence from Bunching Estimation. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29143.pdf（766KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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