| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29154 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29154 |
| Holding Up Green Energy | |
| Nicholas Ryan | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-08-16 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Green energy is produced by relationship-specific assets that are vulnerable to hold-up if contracts are not strictly enforced. I study the role of counterparty risk in the procurement of green energy using data on the universe of solar procurement auctions in India. The Indian context allows clean estimates of how risk affects procurement, because solar power plants set up in the same states, by the same firms, are procured in auctions variously intermediated by either risky states themselves or the central government. I find that: (i) the counterparty risk of an average state increases solar energy prices by 10%; (ii) the intermediation of the central government eliminates this risk premium; (iii) higher prices due to risk reduce investment, because state demand for green energy is elastic. The results suggest that the risk of hold-up places developing countries at a disadvantage in the procurement of green energy. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Development and Growth ; Development ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Energy |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29154 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586827 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nicholas Ryan. Holding Up Green Energy. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29154.pdf（3695KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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