全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Corrective Regulation with Imperfect Instruments

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w29160
来源ID	Working Paper 29160
	Corrective Regulation with Imperfect Instruments
	Eduardo Dávila; Ansgar Walther
发表日期	2021-08-16
出版年	2021
语种	英语
摘要	This paper studies the optimal design of second-best corrective regulation, when some agents or activities cannot be perfectly regulated. We show that policy elasticities and Pigouvian wedges are sufficient statistics to characterize the marginal welfare impact of regulatory policies in a large class of environments. We show that the optimal second-best policy is determined by a subset of policy elasticities: leakage elasticities, and characterize the marginal value of relaxing regulatory constraints. We apply our results to scenarios with unregulated agents/activities and with uniform regulation across agents/activities. We illustrate our results in applications to shadow banking, scale-invariant regulation, asset substitution, and fire sales.
主题	Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Financial Institutions ; Public Economics ; Taxation
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w29160
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586833
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Eduardo Dávila,Ansgar Walther. Corrective Regulation with Imperfect Instruments. 2021.