| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29169 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29169 |
| Competition and Selection in Credit Markets | |
| Constantine Yannelis; Anthony Lee Zhang | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-08-23 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We present both theory and evidence that increased competition may decrease rather than increase consumer welfare in subprime credit markets. We present a model of lending markets with imperfect competition, adverse selection and costly lender screening. In more competitive markets, lenders have lower market shares, and thus lower incentives to monitor borrowers. Thus, when markets are competitive, all lenders face a riskier pool of borrowers, which can lead interest rates to be higher, and consumer welfare to be lower. We provide evidence for the model’s predictions in the auto loan market using administrative credit panel data. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Industrial Organization ; Industry Studies |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29169 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586841 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Constantine Yannelis,Anthony Lee Zhang. Competition and Selection in Credit Markets. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29169.pdf（2530KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
