| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29197 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29197 |
| Sovereign Spreads and the Political Leaning of Nations | |
| Ionut Cotoc; Alok Johri; César Sosa-Padilla | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-08-30 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Nations vary widely in how often they are governed by left-wing governments. Using data from 56 nations over 45 years, we find that the propensity of a nation to elect the left is positively correlated with both the average level and volatility of their sovereign spreads. To explain these facts, we build a quantitative sovereign default model in which two policymakers (left and right) alternate in power. Reelection probabilities are increasing in government spending, with the left having a small advantage (as found in the data). We use variation in the responsiveness of reelection probabilities to government spending in order to create economies that elect the left more or less frequently in equilibrium. We call these the left leaning and the right leaning economy. The left leaning economy faces worse borrowing terms due to higher default risk. Moreover, both policymakers have a greater reluctance for fiscal austerity and choose a higher share of government spending as compared to their counterparts in the right leaning economy. These features imply large welfare losses for households. |
| 主题 | International Economics ; International Finance ; International Macroeconomics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29197 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586870 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ionut Cotoc,Alok Johri,César Sosa-Padilla. Sovereign Spreads and the Political Leaning of Nations. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29197.pdf（799KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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