| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29202 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29202 |
| How Well Does Bargaining Work in Consumer Markets? A Robust Bounds Approach | |
| Joachim Freyberger; Bradley Larsen | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-08-30 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This study provides a structural analysis of detailed, alternating-offer bargaining data from eBay, deriving bounds on buyers and sellers private value distributions using a range of assumptions on behavior. These assumptions range from very weak (assuming only that acceptance and rejection decisions are rational) to less weak (e.g., assuming that bargaining offers are weakly increasing in players' private values). We estimate the bounds and show what they imply for consumer negotiation behavior in theory and practice. For the median product, bargaining ends in impasses in 43% of negotiations even when the buyer values the good more than the seller. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Estimation Methods ; Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Economics of Information ; Industrial Organization ; Industry Studies |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29202 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586875 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Joachim Freyberger,Bradley Larsen. How Well Does Bargaining Work in Consumer Markets? A Robust Bounds Approach. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29202.pdf（657KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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