| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29208 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29208 |
| Who Cares More? Allocation with Diverse Preference Intensities | |
| Pietro Ortoleva; Evgenii Safonov; Leeat Yariv | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-09-06 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Goods and services---public housing, medical appointments, schools---are often allocated to individuals who rank them similarly but differ in their preference intensities. We characterize optimal allocation rules when individual preferences are known and when they are not. Several insights emerge. First-best allocations may involve assigning some agents "lotteries" between high- and low-ranked goods. When preference intensities are private information, second-best allocations always involve such lotteries and, crucially, may coincide with first-best allocations. Furthermore, second-best allocations may entail disposal of services. We discuss a market-based alternative and show how it differs. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Market Structure and Distribution |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29208 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586881 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pietro Ortoleva,Evgenii Safonov,Leeat Yariv. Who Cares More? Allocation with Diverse Preference Intensities. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29208.pdf（620KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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