| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29223 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29223 |
| Misdiagnosing Bank Capital Problems | |
| Jeremy I. Bulow; Paul D. Klemperer | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-09-13 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Banks’ reluctance to repair their balance sheets, combined with deposit insurance and regulatory forbearance in recognizing greater risks and losses, can lead to solvency problems that look like liquidity (bank-run) crises. Regulatory forbearance incentivizes banks to both retain risky loans and reject new good opportunities. With sufficient regulatory forbearance, partially-insured banks act exactly as if they are fully insured. Stress tests certify that uninsured creditors will be paid, not that banks are solvent, and have ambiguous effects on the efficiency of investment. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29223 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586897 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jeremy I. Bulow,Paul D. Klemperer. Misdiagnosing Bank Capital Problems. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29223.pdf（374KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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