| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29265 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29265 |
| Experimental Evidence on Semi-structured Bargaining with Private Information | |
| Margherita Comola; Marcel Fafchamps | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-09-20 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We conduct a laboratory experiment to study a decentralized market where goods are differentiated and evaluations are private. We implement different semi-structured bargaining protocols based on deferred acceptance, and we compare their performance to the benchmark scenario of a sealed-bid auction. We show that bargaining dramatically improves efficiency, mainly to the benefit of players rather than the silent auctioneer. A protocol of unconstrained simultaneous bargaining performs best, doubling the proportion of deals relative to the benchmark. This is because participants seek to reveal information through a gradual bidding-up strategy that favors bargaining environments. Aggregate efficiency nonetheless suffers from the fact that buyers bargain harder than sellers, and that some players over-bargain to appropriate a larger share of the unknown surplus. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Economics of Information |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29265 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586939 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Margherita Comola,Marcel Fafchamps. Experimental Evidence on Semi-structured Bargaining with Private Information. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29265.pdf（739KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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