| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29268 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29268 |
| Signaling in Online Credit Markets | |
| Kei Kawai; Ken Onishi; Kosuke Uetake | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-09-20 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study how signaling affects equilibrium outcomes and welfare in an online credit market using detailed data on loan characteristics and borrower repayment. We build and estimate an equilibrium model in which a borrower may signal her default risk through the reserve interest rate. Comparing a market with and without signaling relative to the benchmark with no asymmetric information, we find that adverse selection destroys as much as 34% of total surplus, up to 78% of which can be restored with signaling. We also estimate backward-bending supply curves for some markets, consistent with the prediction of Stiglitz & Weiss (1981). |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29268 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586942 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kei Kawai,Ken Onishi,Kosuke Uetake. Signaling in Online Credit Markets. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29268.pdf（520KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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