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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w29270
来源IDWorking Paper 29270
Measuring the Welfare Cost of Asymmetric Information in Consumer Credit Markets
Anthony A. DeFusco; Huan Tang; Constantine Yannelis
发表日期2021-09-20
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要Information asymmetries are known in theory to lead to inefficiently low credit provision, yet empirical estimates of the resulting welfare losses are scarce. This paper leverages a randomized experiment conducted by a large fintech lender to estimate welfare losses arising from asymmetric information in the market for online consumer credit. Building on methods from the insurance literature, we show how exogenous variation in interest rates can be used to estimate borrower demand and lender cost curves and recover implied welfare losses. While asymmetric information generates large equilibrium price distortions, we find only small overall welfare losses, particularly for high-credit-score borrowers.
主题Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Economics of Information ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Financial Institutions
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w29270
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586944
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GB/T 7714
Anthony A. DeFusco,Huan Tang,Constantine Yannelis. Measuring the Welfare Cost of Asymmetric Information in Consumer Credit Markets. 2021.
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