全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Why Don\u2019t Elite Colleges Expand Supply?

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w29309
来源ID	Working Paper 29309
	Why Don\u2019t Elite Colleges Expand Supply?
	Peter Q. Blair; Kent Smetters
发表日期	2021-09-27
出版年	2021
语种	英语
摘要	While college enrollment has more-than doubled since 1970, elite colleges have barely increased supply, instead reducing admit rates. We show that straightforward reasons cannot explain this behavior. We propose a model where colleges compete on prestige, measured using relative selectivity or relative admit rates. A key comparative static of the model is that higher demand decreases [increases] the admit rate when the weight on prestige is above [below] a critical value, consistent with experience in elite [non-elite] colleges. A calibrated version of the model closely replicates the pattern in the data of declining admit rates at elite colleges while counter-factual simulations without prestige fail. Prestige competition is inefficient. Allowing elite colleges to collude on admissions strategy internalizes the non-pecuniary prestige externality and is Pareto improving.
主题	Public Economics ; Taxation ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Education ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w29309
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586982
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Peter Q. Blair,Kent Smetters. Why Don\u2019t Elite Colleges Expand Supply?. 2021.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w29309.pdf（717KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览