G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w29397
来源IDWorking Paper 29397
Bank Runs, Fragility, and Credit Easing
Manuel Amador; Javier Bianchi
发表日期2021-10-25
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要We present a tractable dynamic macroeconomic model of self-fulfilling bank runs. A bank is vulnerable to a run when a loss of investors' confidence triggers deposit withdrawals and leads the bank to default on its obligations. We analytically characterize how the vulnerability of an individual bank depends on macroeconomic aggregates and how the number of banks facing a run affects macroeconomic aggregates in turn. In general equilibrium, runs can be partial or complete, depending on aggregate leverage and the dynamics of asset prices. Our normative analysis shows that the effectiveness of credit easing and its welfare implications depend on whether a financial crisis is driven by fundamentals or by self-fulfilling runs.
主题Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Monetary Policy ; International Economics ; International Finance ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w29397
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587071
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GB/T 7714
Manuel Amador,Javier Bianchi. Bank Runs, Fragility, and Credit Easing. 2021.
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