全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Bank Runs, Fragility, and Credit Easing

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w29397
来源ID	Working Paper 29397
	Bank Runs, Fragility, and Credit Easing
	Manuel Amador; Javier Bianchi
发表日期	2021-10-25
出版年	2021
语种	英语
摘要	We present a tractable dynamic macroeconomic model of self-fulfilling bank runs. A bank is vulnerable to a run when a loss of investors' confidence triggers deposit withdrawals and leads the bank to default on its obligations. We analytically characterize how the vulnerability of an individual bank depends on macroeconomic aggregates and how the number of banks facing a run affects macroeconomic aggregates in turn. In general equilibrium, runs can be partial or complete, depending on aggregate leverage and the dynamics of asset prices. Our normative analysis shows that the effectiveness of credit easing and its welfare implications depend on whether a financial crisis is driven by fundamentals or by self-fulfilling runs.
主题	Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Monetary Policy ; International Economics ; International Finance ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w29397
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587071
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Manuel Amador,Javier Bianchi. Bank Runs, Fragility, and Credit Easing. 2021.