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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w29397 |
来源ID | Working Paper 29397 |
Bank Runs, Fragility, and Credit Easing | |
Manuel Amador; Javier Bianchi | |
发表日期 | 2021-10-25 |
出版年 | 2021 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We present a tractable dynamic macroeconomic model of self-fulfilling bank runs. A bank is vulnerable to a run when a loss of investors' confidence triggers deposit withdrawals and leads the bank to default on its obligations. We analytically characterize how the vulnerability of an individual bank depends on macroeconomic aggregates and how the number of banks facing a run affects macroeconomic aggregates in turn. In general equilibrium, runs can be partial or complete, depending on aggregate leverage and the dynamics of asset prices. Our normative analysis shows that the effectiveness of credit easing and its welfare implications depend on whether a financial crisis is driven by fundamentals or by self-fulfilling runs. |
主题 | Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Monetary Policy ; International Economics ; International Finance ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29397 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587071 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Manuel Amador,Javier Bianchi. Bank Runs, Fragility, and Credit Easing. 2021. |
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文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w29397.pdf(1005KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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