| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29406 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29406 |
| Market Segmentation and Competition in Health Insurance | |
| Michael J. Dickstein; Kate Ho; Nathaniel D. Mark | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-10-25 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In the United States, households obtain health insurance through distinct market segments. We explore the economics of this segmentation by comparing coverage provided through small employers versus the individual marketplace. Using data from Oregon, we find households with group coverage spend 26% less on covered health care than households with individual coverage yet face higher markups. We develop a model of plan choice and health spending to estimate preferences in both markets and evaluate integration policies. In our setting, pooling can both mitigate adverse selection in the individual market and benefit small group households without raising taxpayer costs. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Industrial Organization |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29406 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587080 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael J. Dickstein,Kate Ho,Nathaniel D. Mark. Market Segmentation and Competition in Health Insurance. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29406.pdf（957KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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