| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29438 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29438 |
| The Economics of Medical Procedure Innovation | |
| David Dranove; Craig Garthwaite; Christopher Heard; Bingxiao Wu | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-11-01 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper explores the economic incentives for medical procedure innovation. Using a proprietary dataset on billing code applications for emerging medical procedures, we highlight two mechanisms that could hinder innovation. First, the administrative hurdle of securing permanent, reimbursable billing codes substantially delays innovation diffusion. We find that Medicare utilization of innovative procedures increases nearly nine-fold after the billing codes are promoted to permanent (reimbursable) from provisional (non-reimbursable). However, only 29 percent of the provisional codes are promoted within the five-year probation period. Second, medical procedures lack intellectual property rights, especially those without patented devices. When appropriability is limited, specialty medical societies lead the applications for billing codes. We indicate that the ad hoc process for securing billing codes for procedure innovations creates uncertainty about both the development process and the allocation and enforceability of property rights. This stands in stark contrast to the more deliberate regulatory oversight for pharmaceutical innovations. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29438 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587111 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | David Dranove,Craig Garthwaite,Christopher Heard,et al. The Economics of Medical Procedure Innovation. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29438.pdf（1174KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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