| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29445 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29445 |
| Cheap Talk Messages for Market Design: Theory and Evidence from a Labor Market with Directed Search | |
| John J. Horton; Ramesh Johari; Philipp Kircher | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-11-08 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In a model with cheap talk, employers can send messages about their willingness to pay for higher ability workers, which job-seekers can use to direct their search and tailor their wage bid. Introducing such messages leads—under certain conditions—to an informative separating equilibrium which affects the number of applications, types of applications, and wage bids across firms. This model is used to interpret an experiment conducted in a large online labor market: employers were given the opportunity to state their relative willingness to pay for more experienced workers, and workers can easily condition their search on this information. Preferences were collected for all employers, but only treated employers had their signal revealed to job-seekers. In response to revelation of the cheap talk signal, job-seekers targeted their applications to employers of the right “type” and they tailored their wage bids, affecting who was matched to whom and at what wage. The treatment increased measures of match quality through better sorting, illustrating the power of cheap talk to improve market outcomes. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics ; Unemployment and Immigration |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29445 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587119 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | John J. Horton,Ramesh Johari,Philipp Kircher. Cheap Talk Messages for Market Design: Theory and Evidence from a Labor Market with Directed Search. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29445.pdf（569KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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