| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29467 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29467 |
| Intermediation and Voluntary Exposure to Counterparty Risk | |
| Maryam Farboodi | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-11-08 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | I study a model of the financial sector in which intermediation among debt financed banks gives rise to an endogenous core-periphery network – few highly interconnected and many sparsely connected banks. Endogenous intermediation generates excessive systemic risk in the financial network. Financial institutions have incentives to capture intermediation spreads through strategic borrowing and lending decisions. By doing so, they tilt the division of surplus along an intermediation chain in their favor, while at the same time reducing aggregate surplus. The network is inefficient relative to a constrained efficient benchmark since banks who make risky investments “overconnect”, exposing themselves to excessive counterparty risk, while banks who mainly provide funding end up with too few connections. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29467 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587141 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Maryam Farboodi. Intermediation and Voluntary Exposure to Counterparty Risk. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29467.pdf（536KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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