| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29473 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29473 |
| Optimal Bank Reserve Remuneration and Capital Control Policy | |
| Chun-Che Chi; Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé; Martín Uribe | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-11-15 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A central prediction of open economy models with a pecuniary externality due to a collateral constraint is that the unregulated economy overborrows relative to what occurs under optimal policy. A maintained assumption in this literature is that households borrow directly from foreign lenders. This paper shows that if foreign lending is intermediated by domestic banks and the government has access to capital controls and interest on bank reserves, the unregulated economy underborrows. The optimal bank reserve policy is countercyclical. By increasing bank reserves during contractions, the government acts as a lender of last resort to collateral-constrained households. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Monetary Policy ; International Economics ; International Finance ; International Macroeconomics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29473 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587147 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Chun-Che Chi,Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé,Martín Uribe. Optimal Bank Reserve Remuneration and Capital Control Policy. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29473.pdf（511KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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